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Differing Characteristics or Differing Rewards: 
What is Behind the Gender Wage Gap in Croatia? 
 
Abstract: 
This paper aims at estimating the size of, changes in, and main factors contributing to 
gender-based wage differentials in Croatia. It utilises microdata from the Labour Force 
Survey in 1998 and 2005, and applies both OLS and quantile regression techniques to 
assess the gender wage gap across the wage distribution. The gender wage gap is found to 
be relatively mild at the lower part of the wage distribution and is getting larger as one 
moves towards the top of the distribution. The paper argues that employed women in 
Croatia possess higher-quality labour market characteristics, especially levels of education, 
but receive much lower rewards for these characteristics. Some evidence of a glass-ceiling 
effect and occupational segregation are found. The impact of having children on the wage 
prospects of women is also considered. The paper finds that at the top of the wage 
distribution in the private sector mothers earn lower wages than women without children.   
 
Keywords: gender wage gap, glass ceiling, maternity leave, quantile regression 
JEL classification: J16, J31, J71 
 
 
 
Jaz u plaæama izmeðu ena i muškaraca u Hrvatskoj 
 
Saetak: 
U radu se razmatra velièina i èimbenici razlike u plaæama izmeðu ena i muškaraca u 
Hrvatskoj. Koriste se individualni podaci iz Ankete radne snage 1998. i 2005. godine, te se 
uz pomoæ OLS i kvantilnih regresija ocjenjuje jaz na razlièitim dijelovima distribucije plaæa. 
Jaz u plaæama izmeðu ena i muškaraca relativno je mali na donjem kraju distribucije i 
postupno se poveæava prema njenom gornjem kraju. Pokazuje se da zaposlene ene u 
Hrvatskoj opæenito posjeduju bolje radne karakteristike od muškaraca, posebice višu razinu 
obrazovanja, ali da su njihove karakteristike manje cijenjene, odnosno manje plaæene od 
usporedivih karakteristika muškaraca, što dovodi do opaenog jaza u plaæama. U radu se 
nalaze odreðeni argumenti u prilog postojanja «staklenog stropa» (jaz u plaæama najveæi je 
kod najbolje plaæenih radnih mjesta) i rodne segregacije po zanimanjima. Rad razmatra i 
utjecaj roditeljstva na plaæe. Pokazuje se da u privatnom sektoru, u sluèaju relativno dobro 
plaæenih poslova, majke zaraðuju manje od ena bez djece. 
 
Kljuène rijeèi: jaz u plaæama izmeðu ena i muškaraca, «stakleni strop», rodiljni dopust, 
kvantilne regresije 
JEL klasifikacija: J16, J31, J71 
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1 Introduction* 
 
One of the most challenging fields for attaining equal treatment of women and men is 
the labour market. In practically every country, women earn less than men. To explain 
this disparity, labour economists have usually looked at differences in human capital 
characteristics, such as education or experience. Since women, in many countries, have 
poorer education and less labour market experience than men do, productivity gains due 
to these attributes could explain a part of the gender wage gap. The role of job- and firm-
specific factors has also been studied. However, the gap remains even after accounting for 
differences in observed characteristics. The unexplained part of the gender differential in 
wages is sometimes termed discrimination, although it may also include effects of 
unobserved productive characteristics. 
 
In transition countries, gender equality was a highly proclaimed policy goal during the 
socialist era and evidence shows that the difference in wages between women and men 
was rather low at that time (Brainerd, 2000). An egalitarian wage structure was a feature 
not only of centrally planned systems, but also of the worker’s self-management system in 
the former Yugoslavia (Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995). In the transition period, huge 
changes in the structure of the overall economy have induced changes in the wage 
structure. Wage setting mechanism has been liberalised, which has mostly produced 
higher wage inequality. However, it seems that these changes have not contributed to a 
widening of the gender wage gap in the Central and Eastern European countries in the 
first phase of transition (Brainerd, 2000; Newell and Reilly, 2001). In the later stages of 
transition, the gender wage gap has become visible, although rather modest by 
international standards (Rutkowski, 2001).  
 
The relatively low observed gender pay gap in most of the former socialist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) may be misleading in judging the status of women in 
the labour market in at least three aspects. The first is their relatively low employment 
rate; the second is the pronounced educational advantage of female employees over their 
male counterparts; and the third is women’s role in terms of family responsibilities.1 A 
low employment rate points to certain barriers for women to enter the job market and 
find a job. Educational attainment of women which is higher than that of men means 
that the gender wage gap for comparable educational levels is larger than the average 
                                                 
* This research was supported by a grant from the CERGE-EI Foundation under a program of the Global Development 
Network. All opinions expressed are those of the author and have not been endorsed by CERGE-EI or the GDN. 
1 For 2005, Eurostat reports (http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int) on unadjusted gender pay gap in Slovenia of 8 percent, 
Poland 10 percent, Hungary 11 percent, Romania 13 percent, and Bulgaria 16 percent. The average for “old” EU 
members (EU15) was 15 percent, while the Baltic States, Czech Republic, and Slovakia experienced somewhat higher 
gap. Educational advantage of women in CEE countries can be illustrated by the Eurostat data on the share of 
employees with tertiary education. For 10 former socialist countries and current EU member states, there was 28 
percent of female workers with tertiary education, as compared to 19 percent among male workers in 2005 (unweighted 
average). In “old” EU15 countries the female educational advantage was lower than in the CEE countries, with 31 
percent of highly educated female workers versus 26 percent among male workers (unweighted average). The evidence 
that many of CEE countries have relatively generous maternity and parental leaves can be found, for instance, on the 
web pages of the European Industrial Relations Observatory (http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro). 
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unadjusted gap. Further, this suggests that the productive characteristics of women may 
be much less appreciated than that of men. Lengthy absence from work due to child 
bearing may preclude women from earning more.  
 
This paper examines the effects of various labour market characteristics, including the 
effects of having children, on the gender wag gap in a transition economy – Croatia. The 
female/male wage ratio in Croatia for 2005 was estimated at 0.88, showing the raw gender 
wage gap of 12 percent. This is one of the lowest unadjusted gaps in Europe. However, 
after taking into account differences in education, experience and workplace-related 
factors, Nestić (2005) found the gender wage gap to be somewhat wider, around 15 
percent in 2003. Bisogno (2000) reported on a gap of 20 percent in 1998. The current 
study goes further in exploring the gender wage gap by using quantile regression 
technique in order to estimate the conditional wage gap at various points of the 
distribution, for example for low-paid workers at the 10th percentile or for high-paid 
workers at the 90th percentile. Machado-Mata (2005) decomposition analysis is employed 
to extract the part of the gap that is due to differing rewards to observed productive 
factors for women and men.  
 
This paper also explores the possible impact of relatively generous entitlements for 
maternity leave and child-related sick leave on the wage prospects of women in Croatia. 
The effect of children and family obligations on the relative wages of women has been 
carefully studied for Nordic countries and major industrial countries, such as the US or 
the UK (see, for instance, Datta Gupta et. al., 2006 for an overview), but there is little 
evidence from transition countries. Relatively generous maternity and paternal leave 
entitlement has been introduced in many transition countries in a completely different 
environment from the Nordic countries. Croatia, for example, has a comparable length 
of leave, but dissimilarly low compensation rate, low labour mobility, weak job creation, 
a poor child care system, and a relatively strong role of a traditional lifestyle. Although 
the significant effect of children on the relative wages of women in Nordic countries is 
not found (see for example, Rosholm and Smith, 1996; Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002), a 
transition country case may prove the opposite. 
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology used. 
Section 3 describes the data and presents preliminary evidence on the wage distribution 
in Croatia. Discussion of major findings of the gender wage gap estimates made by 
quantile regressions and decomposition analysis is provided in Section 4. Section 5 
explores the gender gap faced by mothers, as compared to other women. Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
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2 Methodology 
 
The raw (unadjusted) wage gap, calculated as the difference between the average wage of 
male and female workers, is the first indication of underlying gender wage inequality. 
However, the observed wage differential between male and female employees could be 
caused by differences in the stock of human capital, which further implies differences in 
productivity levels. Many other possible factors could also determine this differential, 
some of which could be justifiable from an economic point of view. Regression estimates 
of the earnings functions are employed to check for the impact of these various factors. 
 
The applied wage functions follow the standard Mincer-type specification (Mincer, 1974), 
where the log wage rate is regressed to the set of variables representing individual human 
capital characteristics of workers such as education and experience. Other variables are 
added to control for the effects of job and employer characteristics. The estimated 
coefficient on the gender dummy in this setting gives an indication of the gender wage 
gap.  
 
Apart from the models estimated by the OLS, quantile regressions are run to enable 
further insights into the wage structure.2 We also apply the Machado-Mata decomposition 
analysis to distinguish that part of gap that is due to male/female differences in returns 
from the part which is due to differences in labour market characteristics.3  
 
 
2.1 Quantile Regressions  
 
The quantile regression technique allows us to explore the effect of each explanatory 
variable across the whole distribution, rather than just the effect upon the mean, as is the 
case with the least squares estimates. Estimation procedure in the quantile regression 
model can be viewed as the problem of minimizing a sum of absolute residuals. Basically, 
the solution at different quantiles is found by the asymmetrical weighting of absolute 
residuals. For the estimation at lower quantiles, the higher weights are given to the 
negative residuals, and the opposite is done at upper quantiles.  
 
The quantile regression model is formulated as: 
 
,)(ln,ln θiiiiθii βXX|WQuantuβXW ′=+′= θθ          (1) 
 
where ln Wi denotes the log wage of the worker i, Xi is a vector of explanatory variables, 
Xi1 ≡ 1, and βθ is a vector of coefficients. Quant θ (lnW | X) denotes θ th conditional 
                                                 
2 Studies using the quantile regression approach include, for example, Buchinsky (1994, 1998) for the analysis of the US 
wage structure, Machado and Mata (2001) for the wage structure in Portugal, and Garcia et al. (2001) for Spain. Newell 
and Reilly (2001) used this technique for studying the gender wage gap in transition countries. 
3 In empirical studies, the Machado-Mata approach was used, for instance, in Albrecht et al. (2003) for Sweden, 
Arulampalam, et al. (2004) for the EU countries, de la Rica at al. (2005) for Spain, and Kee (2006) for Australia. 
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quantile of lnW, conditional on the regressor vector X. Partial derivative of the 
conditional quantile of lnW with respect to regressor j, ∂Quantθ(lnW | X) / ∂xj could be 
interpreted as a marginal change in the θth conditional quantile due to a marginal 
change in the j th element of X. Each of these derivatives is given just by βθj, measuring 
the marginal change mentioned above. An interesting case appears if the βθj coefficients 
vary systematically across θ’s, indicating that the marginal effect of a particular 
explanatory variable is not uniform across different quantiles of the conditional 
distribution of lnW.  
 
With respect to varying coefficients indicating the gender gap, the quantile regression 
approach enables us to explore two potentially important phenomena – the glass ceiling 
and the sticky floor. Glass ceiling is the term used to describe an unacknowledged barrier 
that prevents women from advancing to positions of power and responsibility, or more 
generally to better-paid jobs. In contrast, the sticky floor can be viewed as a situation 
where women workers are kept in low-level positions without adequate wages. If one 
could find evidence of a widening gap at the upper end of the wage distribution, that 
could signal the presence of a glass ceiling, and if the gap is wider at the bottom end of 
the distribution, a sticky floor could be in place.  
 
 
2.2 Decomposition of the Gender Wage Gap 
 
Wage regressions that include the gender dummy (without interactive variables) assume 
equal returns to observable characteristics for women and men, which may not hold in 
reality. Coefficients from wage regressions estimated separately for women and men, if 
substantially different, point to the unequal rewards to labour market characteristics. This 
situation allows us to go a step further in depicting the gender wage gap by isolating a 
part of the wage gap that could be explained by the difference in observable productive 
characteristics between women and men, for example, education and experience, from the 
part which is due to the difference in returns to these characteristics between women and 
men.  
 
The different returns cannot be easily explained in a competitive setting. They are 
supposedly due to the labour market discrimination or some unobserved characteristics 
of employees or jobs. 
 
In order to decompose the gap into these two parts, we employ the methodology 
proposed by Machado and Mata (2005), which extends the Oaxaca-Blinder wage 
decomposition method to quantile regressions. The general idea is to generate the female 
wage distribution that would emerge if women were given men’s labour market 
characteristics, but remained to receive returns to those characteristics like women. Such a 
counterfactual distribution is compared with the estimated male wage distribution.4 The 
                                                 
4 Note that the decomposition could also be made with the counterfactual distribution calculated for women if they 
retain their own labour market characteristics, but supposedly are paid like men. 
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gap between identical men and women in terms of their characteristics could then be 
attributed to an unequal gender treatment.  
 
Decomposition of the difference between male and female log wage distributions is given 
by: 
 
),()'( ''' fmmffmffmm XXXXX θθθθθ βββββ −+−=−         (2) 
 
where superscripts m and f stand for male and female, respectively. The first term on the 
right-hand side describes a part of the gap due to differing characteristics, while the 
second term is a part of the gap due to differing returns.  
 
In this study, the Machado-Mata bootstrap technique is applied with certain 
simplifications, as suggested by Albrecht et al. (2003). The estimation procedure can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
1) Using the male and female data sets separately, quantile regression coefficient 
vectors mθβ  and fθβ  are estimated for each percentile (θ = 1, … 99);  
2) From the male data set, a sample of the size M=100 is drawn at random with a 
replacement for each percentile. A total of M x 99 draws is made; 
3) For each percentile, characteristics of the sampled males are used to predict wages 
by using the estimated coefficient vectors mθβ  and fθβ . This process generates 
two sets of 9900 predicted wages covering the whole distribution and enables us 
to calculate the wage distribution for males from one set together with the 
counterfactual wage distribution for females if they have had male characteristics 
from the other set; 
4) The counterfactual gap is estimated by taking the difference between the 
calculated male and female wage distributions.  
 
The procedure has been repeated 200 times in order to estimate standard errors for the 
calculated distributions. 
 
The gap estimated by the described procedure at various points of the wage distribution 
is the second part of the decomposed gender wage gap from equation (2). It points to the 
wage difference which women would face even if they had the same characteristics as 
men. This wage difference is due to differing rewards to labour market characteristics and 
is labelled the counterfactual gender wage gap. 
 
For comparison, we calculate the mean counterfactual gap by employing the Oaxaca-
Blinder technique (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973). Accordingly, the mean counterfactual 
gap is calculated as the difference between the predicted average wages for men and the 
predicted counterfactual average wage for women. Both predicted wages are calculated as 
a product of the average male labour market characteristics and the gender specific OLS 
coefficient estimates.  
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3 Data  
 
3.1 Data description 
 
The data employed in this study were obtained from the Croatian Labour Force Survey 
(LFS) for 1998 and 2005.5 The Survey was carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics 
(CBS) and administered to a random sample of Croatians living throughout the country. 
The interviewees were asked to provide information on activity status, gender, age, work 
experience, and education, but also on employer and job characteristics, such as company 
size, industry sector, ownership status, occupation, and working conditions. More 
importantly, they reported on monthly wages for their primary job (net of contributions 
and taxes) and the hours of work performed per week, thus making it possible to 
calculate the hourly wage rate. 
 
The survey is regularly conducted on a semi-annual basis, but we pooled two adjacent 
survey data to construct annual observations to increase the precision of estimates. The 
sampling procedure applied by the CBS allows data pooling. Namely, the LFS sample is 
chosen for the whole year and then divided into two parts, one for each half of the year. 
 
The 1998 LFS covers 38,533 resident individuals of all ages and employment status, while 
the 2005 LFS recorded the information on 31,636 individuals. The lower number of 
surveyed individuals in the latter year is the result of a higher non-response rate. For the 
purpose of this study, the sample was restricted to employed persons. More precisely, we 
included only individuals over 15 years of age, who were in paid employment and were 
not self-employed, because entrepreneurial skills and capital invested in self-employment 
generate remuneration that cannot be separated from the payment for work. Occasional 
and family workers, as well as working retirees, were also excluded since their earnings 
exhibit an unstable link to human capital attributes. A total of 10,066 individuals 
remained in the 1998 sample, and a total of 9,202 individuals in the 2005 sample.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The Labour Force Survey is a relatively new survey instrument in Croatia, established in 1996. In order to examine 
changes in the structure of wages, we decided to use data for the first and the last year for which comparable and 
detailed individual information on wages, human capital, job, and employer characteristics were available (i.e. 1998 and 
2005).  
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Table 1  Descriptive Statistics 
 1998 2005 
 Male Female Male Female 
Observations 5,354 4,712 5,062 4,140 
Mean Log Hourly Wage 2.59 2.45 3.08 2.95 
 (0.43) (0.43) (0.44) (0.43) 
Quantile 
q10 2.05 1.93 2.53 2.42 
q25 2.30 2.17 2.79 2.62 
q50 2.57 2.46 3.06 2.93 
q75 2.88 2.75 3.34 3.24 
q90 3.09 2.95 3.62 3.44 
Dispersion 
q(90)-q(10) 1.04 1.02 1.10 1.02 
q(75)-q(25) 0.58 0.58 0.55 0.62 
Age 38.63 36.88 39.78 39.39 
 (10.56) (9.66) (11.39) (10.33) 
Work Experience (years) 17.23 15.07 17.89 16.68 
 (10.41) (9.47) (11.29) (10.51) 
Tenure (years) 10.97 10.69 11.25 11.41 
 (9.95) (9.35) (10.49) (10.22) 
Public Sector  0.63 0.60 0.41 0.44 
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) 
Years of Schooling 11.51 11.84 11.65 12.11 
 (2.65) (2.72) (2.30) (2.48) 
Education Attainment 
Primary or Less 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.14 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.34) (0.34) 
Secondary 0.64 0.61 0.70 0.62 
 (0.48) (0.49) (0.46) (0.49) 
Tertiary 0.17 0.21 0.16 0.24 
 (0.37) (0.41) (0.36) (0.43) 
 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Log hourly wages are expressed in the current values of a given year. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 Labour Force Survey. 
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Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the wage distribution for sampled individuals 
as well as the means and standard deviations of the main variables used in the study. In 
1998, the sample included 46.8 percent of women, while in 2005 this had declined to 45 
percent. The difference between the mean log hourly wage for men and women in 1998 
was 0.14 (2.59-2.45). This difference is called the raw gender gap and it will later be 
interpreted in terms of a percentage difference (14 percent). An increase in the average 
wage from 1998 to 2005 was higher for women than men, resulting in a slight decrease in 
the raw gender gap. The dispersion of male wages seems higher than that of female wages, 
if one looks at the tail of the log hourly wage distribution, such as the difference between 
the 90th and the 10th quantile (percentile) in both 1998 and 2005. But the opposite can be 
seen in 2005 in the middle of the distribution through a difference between the 75th and 
the 25th quantile, where female wages are more dispersed. Difference in the shape of male 
and female wage distribution in 1998 and 2005 are shown in Figure 1, where the density 
of observations is approximated by kernel density estimators. 
 
The characteristics of employed men and women changed somewhat between 1998 and 
2005. The average age of female workers increased by 2.5 years and came very close to 
that for male workers in 2005. This is somewhat surprising since the legal retirement age 
for women is 5 years lower than that for men. Two explanations could be given here. 
One relates to the early retirement of disabled persons due to war, prevailing in the male 
population, and the other is the longer formal education of the female population, 
which results in a postponement of their labour market participation until a more 
advanced age. Better educational attainment of employed women is shown in more years 
of schooling (12.1 as opposed to 11.6 in 2005), or in the higher portion of women with 
completed tertiary education (24 percent as opposed to 16 percent in 2005). It should be 
noted that the actual work experience for women is one year lower than that for men (in 
2005), which could be considered a very low difference in terms of international 
comparisons. Tenure (the number of years with the same employer) increased between 
1998 and 2005 for both male and female workers, reflecting a consolidation of the 
Croatian business sector. This also points to relatively weak labour flows. A decreasing 
share of employment in the public sector is a result of the ongoing process of 
privatisation of the economy. It should be noted that the public/private sector 
distinction is based on the ownership status, with the public sector including state-owned 
companies. 
 
 
3.2 Preliminary Evidence 
 
An informative comparison between the wage distributions for men and women is 
provided by a quantile-quantile plot. This kind of graph relates quantiles of the variable 
on the vertical axis to quantiles of the variable on the horizontal axis. A point on the 
symmetry line indicates that a quantile of one distribution has the same value as the 
corresponding quantile of the other distribution. Figure 2 contains plots of male/female 
wage distributions for 1998 and 2005. The left panel of Figure 2 shows a quantile-
 16 
quantile plot of the male and female log hourly wages in 1998. Most of the observations 
are slightly above the diagonal line, implying that wages for male workers are slightly 
higher than wages for female workers for comparable quantiles of the wage distribution. 
At lower to middle quantiles, the difference is quite small. However, when approaching 
higher quantiles, the male/female wage gap becomes larger. In other words, there is a 
larger relative discrepancy between male and female wages among higher-paid than lower-
paid workers. An even more pronounced effect is found in 2005. This evidence illustrates 
the importance of investigating wages at different points of the distribution.  
 
The raw gender wage gap is calculated as the difference in log hourly wages between 
female and male workers at various points of distribution. Selected results are presented 
in Table 2. At the mean, the overall gap is a bit lower in 2005 than in 1998, and it is 
clearly higher in the private sector than in the public sector. The private/public sector 
discrepancy in the raw gender gap increased from 1998 to 2005, when the gap in the 
private sector reached 18.6 percent, as opposed to 6.6 percent in the public sector. In the 
public sector, the mean gap reduced notably by 2005 due to the privatisation process and 
accordingly stronger influence of the budgetary part of the public sector which usually 
operates a more equitable wage policy. The mean gender gap is generally lower at higher 
levels of education. However, the gap for post-secondary education increased between 
1998 and 2005. In the 2000s, Croatia has experienced stable economic growth and 
entered the phase of mature transition after the turbulent 1990s (including the war for 
independence) that have caused a stretching of the overall transition process. The wage 
setting mechanism in the 2000s has become more and more market driven, where 
increased inequality in returns of various productive characteristics could be expected. 
The proximate stability of the mean raw gender gap is therefore good news in such an 
environment. 
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Table 2  The Raw Gender Wage Gap by Sector and Education Level 
 Quantile 
 
Mean 
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
1998 
Total -0.139 -0.123 -0.134 -0.116 -0.134 -0.145 
Private Sector  -0.169 -0.097 -0.134 -0.223 -0.223 -0.154 
Public Sector -0.114 -0.203 -0.182 -0.093 -0.089 -0.092 
Unfinished Primary -0.198 -0.120 -0.141 -0.198 -0.239 -0.233 
Primary (8-year) -0.233 -0.173 -0.174 -0.203 -0.258 -0.300 
Vocational Secondary -0.281 -0.182 -0.239 -0.304 -0.329 -0.357 
General Secondary -0.119 -0.105 -0.148 -0.126 -0.113 -0.139 
2-year College -0.126 -0.031 -0.047 -0.087 -0.174 -0.154 
College Graduate -0.147 -0.195 -0.105 -0.105 -0.174 -0.183 
Postgraduate -0.082 0.000 -0.065 -0.082 -0.043 -0.268 
2005 
Total -0.125 -0.105 -0.167 -0.134 -0.094 -0.182 
Private Sector  -0.186 -0.148 -0.174 -0.182 -0.182 -0.239 
Public Sector -0.066 -0.123 -0.065 0.000 -0.090 -0.049 
Unfinished Primary -0.152 -0.105 -0.152 -0.128 -0.159 -0.182 
Primary (8-year) -0.256 -0.134 -0.201 -0.261 -0.336 -0.288 
Vocational Secondary -0.266 -0.211 -0.272 -0.231 -0.301 -0.308 
General Secondary -0.138 -0.095 -0.134 -0.145 -0.118 -0.144 
2-year College -0.163 -0.033 -0.085 -0.112 -0.231 -0.375 
College Graduate -0.167 -0.174 -0.118 -0.154 -0.223 -0.274 
Postgraduate -0.138 -0.041 -0.133 -0.121 -0.128 -0.377 
 
Note: Raw gender wage gap is calculated as the difference of the log female and log male hourly wage. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 Labour Force Survey. 
 
 
The gender gap varies in different parts of the distribution. In the private sector, the gap 
is the lowest at the bottom end of the distribution and it increases as we move upward 
along the wage distribution (as an exception, in 1998 this is not observed at the 90th 
quantile). In 2005, the gap widens towards the upper tail of the wage distribution in the 
private sector, suggesting the possible existence of a glass-ceiling effect. This effect needs 
to be confirmed in the analysis. In the public sector, the opposite tendency is found in 
1998. In that respect, the possible presence of sticky floor effects should be further 
explored. As for the gender wage gap at different levels of education, a larger gap is 
generally observed at higher quantiles of the wage distribution for all levels of education.  
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4 Estimates of the Gender Wage Gap  
 
Wage regressions account for various factors that may explain the differences in 
individual wages, including gender. The estimated coefficients for a gender dummy from 
wage regression captures the extent to which the wage gap between women and men 
remains unexplained after checking for other individual, job, and company differences. 
We refer to these as the gender wage gap. In this section, results from a series of quantile 
regressions on the pooled male and female datasets are presented first. Then, estimations 
from separate regressions for men and women are shown in order to illustrate gender 
differences in returns to the labour market characteristics. Finally, results from the 
counterfactual decompositions are discussed.  
 
 
4.1 Pooled Quantile Regressions 
 
Table 3 presents regression results for the gender wage gap. Quantile regression estimates 
are shown at five points of the log hourly wage distribution; the 10th, 25th, 50th (median), 
75th, and 90th quantile. In order to take the correlation among various quantile 
regressions into account, the selected quantiles are estimated simultaneously, thus 
allowing a formal comparison of the coefficients describing different quantiles. Estimates 
of standard errors are obtained via bootstrapping, using 50 replications.6 Ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression estimates are presented for comparison.  
 
The first row of Table 3 shows the gender gap in the regression specification without any 
control variables except gender. The coefficient estimated for the gender dummy is the 
raw gender gap, which is the same as the total log wage difference from Table 2. However, 
here we could assign standard errors to the estimated gap. Other results are organised 
around three models. Model (1) includes basic human capital control variables 
(education level, experience and experience squared). The extended model (2) aims to 
include other available variables representing the characteristics that count in the wage 
determination (employer size, sector, irregular working hours, rural area, and 
immigrants) but without occupation.7 The “full” model (3) is the same as the extended 
one, but includes the set of occupational dummies.8 Occupation is usually significant in 
accounting for gender wage differences, but it can be rather strongly linked to 
educational attainment. The inclusion of occupation variables in the model, together 
                                                 
6 In quantile regressions, the bootstrap standard errors could be preferable to those calculated analytically, as suggested 
by Rogers (1992). 
7 There are four dummies for company size, defined with respect to the number of employees. As immigrants, we count 
persons who have come from abroad to the current place of residence after 1991, when Croatia declared its 
independence. The dummy variable for non-regular working hours is defined in order to pick up the effect of 
unfavourable working conditions and takes the value 1 in two cases: (i) if one always works at nights and (ii) if one 
sometimes works at nights, sometimes on Saturdays, and sometimes on Sundays. The public sector dummy variable 
refers to individuals working in the state-owned institutions and enterprises. 
8 Occupation is actually represented by a set of dummy variables for each of the ten main occupation categories 
defined according to the standard (ISCO) classification.  
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with education variables, introduces a potential problem with the endogenity of 
explanatory variables. However, the advantage of having two otherwise identical models 
(one with and the other without occupation) is that this enables us to account for the 
sole impact of occupational division on the gender wage gap.9 Estimated coefficients for 
all the variables included in model (3) are presented in tables A1 and A2 in Appendix, 
while Table 3 presents coefficient estimates for the gender dummy, i.e. the gender wage 
gap.  
 
In the model that controls for human capital variables, the mean gender wage gap (OLS 
estimate) is found to be higher than the raw gender wage gap for both 1998 and 2005. A 
considerable increase is also found at the 50th, 75th and 95th quantiles. This result reflects 
a much better educational attainment of employed women, especially in higher-paid jobs. 
In a situation where returns to education are the same for male and female workers 
(which is imposed by the pooled regression model), the educational advantage of 
employed women results in a wider estimated gender wage gap as compared to the raw 
gap. Once we control for education and experience, a comparison of the gender gap in 
1998 and 2005 points to its widening at all the observed points of the conditional wage 
distribution (for instance, from 16.2 percent in 1998 to 18.2 percent in 2005 estimated at 
the median)10. Further improvement in women’s relative educational attainment and a 
narrowing of their experience disadvantage between 1998 and 2005 (see Table 1) did not 
contribute to any marked improvement in women’s relative wages, as measured by the 
raw gender wage gap. 
 
Inclusion of other control variables somewhat reduces the estimated mean gender wage 
gap in comparison with the model that includes basic controls. However, it appears that 
variations in other labour characteristics are important in explaining the gender wage 
gap, although not as much as education and experience. In 2005, inclusion of the 
broadest set of control variables in model (3) still leaves almost 17 percent of the gender 
wage differences unexplained on average, as compared to 19.3 percent in model (1) (OLS 
estimate). Occupation affected a portion of the gap in 2005, as indicated by its notable 
narrowing between the model (2) and (3) at all the observed parts of the distribution. For 
example, the gender gap at the 10th quantile reduces from 12.9 percent to 10.4 percent. In 
spite of only 10 occupation categories being considered, this result suggests that 
occupational segregation accounts for a part of the gender wage differential in Croatia.  
 
Quantile regression results in Table 3 mostly show an acceleration of the gender wage gap 
at higher quantiles, almost independent of the set of control variables included. For 
                                                 
9 Some other control variables could be added too. Variables for industry affiliation are often considered in similar 
studies. Industry wage differentials might be substantial. However, in Croatia it might be affected by ownership, since 
there are industries that are clearly dominated by state-ownership, such as utilities, education, health care, and public 
administration. Since this study is more interested in ownership effects that should be distinguished from industry 
effects, variables for industry affiliation are not incorporated in the analysis. 
10 A log-linear specification of the wage function allows us to treat the estimated coefficients (if multiplied by 100) as 
percentage changes in a conditional hourly wage that is due to a marginal change in regressor, i.e. due to the 
male/female switch. 
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example, in 1998, at the 10th quantile, employed women earned about 11.6 percent less 
than men. At the 90th quantile, the gap widens to 20.4 percent in the model with the 
broadest set of control variables. In other words, in well-paid jobs, women are relatively 
more disadvantaged than in less-paid jobs. An even higher disproportion between the gap 
in poorly-paid and well-paid jobs is observed for 2005. 
 
Table 3  Gender Wage Gap Based on Pooled Quantile Regressions 
 Quantile 
 
OLS 
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
1998 
Raw Gender Gap -0.139 -0.123 -0.134 -0.116 -0.134 -0.145 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.019) 
(1) Gap with education and experience as 
control variables 
 
-0.163 
 
-0.120 
 
-0.132 
 
-0.162 
 
-0.180 
 
-0.192 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.015) 
(2) Gap with education, experience, 
employer size, sector, immigrant, 
rural, and non-regular working hours 
as control variables -0.165 -0.121 -0.126 -0.153 -0.186 -0.210 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) 
(3) Gap with education, experience, 
employer size, sector, and other 
control variables, including occupation 
 
 
-0.160 
 
 
-0.116 
 
 
-0.130 
 
 
-0.157 
 
 
-0.177 
 
 
-0.204 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) 
2005 
Raw Gender Gap -0.125 -0.105 -0.167 -0.134 -0.094 -0.182 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
(1) Gap with education and experience as 
control variables 
 
-0.193 
 
-0.146 
 
-0.160 
 
-0.182 
 
-0.211 
 
-0.235 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.015) 
(2) Gap with education, experience, 
employer size, sector, immigrant, 
rural, and non-regular working hours 
as control variables -0.184 -0.129 -0.158 -0.170 -0.206 -0.229 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.016) 
(3) Gap with education, experience, 
employer size, sector, and other 
control variables, including occupation 
 
 
-0.169 
 
 
-0.104 
 
 
-0.140 
 
 
-0.168 
 
 
-0.191 
 
 
-0.217 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) 
 
Note: Reported figures are the estimated coefficients for the gender dummy, followed by standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistics are computed using the bootstrap estimator. All the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. A 
complete set of estimated coefficients for the specification (3) in the OLS and quantile regressions is presented in Tables A1 
and A2 in Appendix. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 Labour Force Survey. 
 
 
To test if the differences in the estimated gender gap between various quantiles are 
statistically significant, we have run several interquantile regressions. The results are 
reported in Table 4. Differences in the gender dummy coefficients between the 90th and 
10th quantile, as well as between the 75th and 25th quantile are statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level for each model. This suggests that quantile regressions, in general, do a 
good job representing a range of effects along the wage distribution. By relying only on 
the average gender gap estimated by the OLS, we might have overlooked its important 
features. The gender wage gap is shown higher at the upper tail of distribution. The 
estimated difference of around 2.5 percent in 1998 and 2005 between the gap at the 90th 
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and 75th quantile is significant at the 5 percent level for the model that includes the 
broadest set of control variables, while the statistical significance of the difference 
vanished in the model with basic human capital variables. Somewhat higher statistical 
confidence may be expressed for the differences in estimated coefficients on the gender 
dummy at the 75th and 50th quantile. To a certain extent, the gender wage gap, which is 
mostly shown as significantly higher at the upper tail of the wage distribution, confirms 
the presence of a glass-ceiling effect in Croatia.  
 
Table 4  Results of Interquantile Regressions 
 90th – 10th 75th – 25th 75th – 50th 90th – 75th 
1998 
(1) Gap with education and experience as 
control variables -0.072*** -0.048*** -0.019** -0.012 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) 
(2) Gap with education, experience, employer 
size, sector, immigrant, rural, and non-
regular working hours as control variables -0.089*** -0.060*** -0.033*** -0.023* 
 (0.020) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) 
(3) Gap with education, experience, employer 
size, sector, and other control variables, 
including occupation -0.089*** -0.046*** -0.019** -0.028** 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) 
2005 
(1) Gap with education and experience as 
control variables -0.089*** -0.051*** -0.029*** -0.024 
 (0.018) (0.011) (0.007) (0.015) 
(2) Gap with education, experience, employer 
size, sector, immigrant, rural, and non-
regular working hours as control variables -0.100*** -0.049*** -0.036*** -0.023* 
 (0.020) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013) 
(3) Gap with education, experience, employer 
size, sector, and other control variables, 
including occupation -0.112*** -0.051*** -0.023*** -0.025** 
 (0.019) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) 
 
Note: Reported figures are the estimated coefficients for the gender dummy, followed by standard errors in parentheses. 
Statistics are computed using the bootstrap estimator. * denotes statistical significance at the 10 percent. ** denotes 
statistical significance at the 5 percent. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 Labour Force Survey. 
 
 
Turning back to Table 3, we can now compare the estimated gender wage gap in 1998 
and 2005. There was only a minor increase in the gap from 1998 to 2005 in model (3) on 
average and at most parts of the wage distribution (except at the 10th quantile). However, 
in model (2), which excludes the influence of occupational divisions, the gap is found to 
be notably higher in 2005 than in 1998 (18.4 percent vs. 16.5 percent on average). It 
appears that the Croatian transition in the 2000s, especially the increasing share of the 
private sector due to the privatisation of state-owned companies and growth of its 
business, has eventually brought a certain increase in the gender wage gap in spite of the 
improved legislative situation, where the Labour Law and the Gender Equality Law (the 
latter enacted in 2003) declare an equal treatment of women in the labour market. The 
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wage gap in the private sector is found to be wider than in the public sector (see Section 
5) and notable expansion of the private sector has contributed to the overall increase in 
the gender wage gap.  
 
 
4.2 Quantile Regressions by Gender 
 
Rewards relating to the labour market characteristics may differ between men and women 
rather than being equal, as assumed in the pooled quantile regressions. Quantile 
regression estimates performed separately for men and women can reveal this situation at 
various points in their respective distribution. Table 5 presents gender specific rewards to 
education and experience (i.e. their estimated coefficients) in the specification that also 
controls for firm size, occupation, and dummies for sector, urban/rural residence, non-
regular working hours, and immigrant status. Results are shown for 2005. Results for 
1998 convey basically the same message and are not presented here to save space.  
 
The marginal returns to experience for men are considerably above the corresponding 
returns for women, and the difference grows at the upper parts of the wage distribution, 
as suggested by the estimated coefficients on experience. The first year of experience will 
bring a 1.7 percent higher wage on average to a man and 0.8 percent to a woman. At the 
90th quantile, the corresponding rewards are 2.2 percent for men and 0.8 percent for 
women. However, at the actual work experience of around 30 years, men start to exhibit 
negative returns, while the wage-experience profile for women is found to be much 
flatter, as indicated by the estimated coefficients for experience squared. Therefore, 
women’s experience at the later stages of working life is rewarded more than men’s 
experience.  
 
Women face strikingly lower returns to education at all levels of education and at all 
points of the wage distribution. This is particularly the case for higher levels of education 
(i.e. post-secondary) and at the top of the wage distribution. For example, at the 90th 
quantile, the reward for a male employee who holds a university degree is estimated to be 
around 22 percent higher (i.e. 0.515-0.299) than the corresponding reward for a woman. 
Such a difference at the median is estimated at about 10 percent.  
 
Results presented in Table 5 suggest that returns to education and returns to experience 
are different for males and females in Croatia. This stresses the importance of accounting 
for gender specific returns to labour market characteristics in the gender wage gap 
estimation. 
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Table 5  Quantile Regressions by Gender, 2005 
Quantile  
OLS 
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Women 
Experience 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Experience squared (/100) -0.003 -0.011 -0.010** -0.003 -0.009** -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) 
Primary -0.026 0.017 -0.001 -0.023 -0.024 -0.017 
 (0.059) (0.078) (0.074) (0.046) (0.071) (0.249) 
Vocational Secondary 0.056 0.142* 0.074 0.056 0.038 0.025 
 (0.059) (0.080) (0.071) (0.046) (0.069) (0.246) 
General Secondary 0.122** 0.213*** 0.116* 0.132*** 0.112* 0.093 
 (0.060) (0.079) (0.066) (0.047) (0.067) (0.247) 
2-year College 0.216*** 0.335*** 0.245*** 0.221*** 0.186*** 0.183 
 (0.061) (0.089) (0.069) (0.051) (0.072) (0.242) 
University Graduate 0.305*** 0.374*** 0.333*** 0.335*** 0.280*** 0.299 
 (0.065) (0.095) (0.081) (0.059) (0.077) (0.242) 
Postgraduate 0.596*** 0.610*** 0.555*** 0.594*** 0.629*** 0.560*** 
 (0.088) (0.115) (0.107) (0.107) (0.101) (0.372) 
Constant 2.422*** 2.004*** 2.205*** 2.400*** 2.602*** 2.768*** 
 (0.060) (0.087) (0.082) (0.049) (0.063) (0.249) 
Men 
Experience 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002 (0.002) (0.003) 
Experience squared (/100) -0.033*** -0.022*** -0.028*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.041*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) 
Primary 0.069 0.127 0.111*** 0.100*** 0.060*** 0.102 
 (0.060) (0.085) (0.047) (0.044) (0.057) (0.119) 
Vocational Secondary 0.160*** 0.243*** 0.232*** 0.192*** 0.131** 0.154 
 (0.060) (0.086) (0.044) (0.044) (0.056) (0.123) 
General Secondary 0.233*** 0.305*** 0.272*** 0.264*** 0.222*** 0.231* 
 (0.060) (0.083) (0.050) (0.049) (0.059) (0.124) 
2-year College 0.368*** 0.392*** 0.399*** 0.390*** 0.340*** 0.434*** 
 (0.064) (0.089) (0.051) (0.055) (0.070) (0.132) 
University Graduate 0.447*** 0.538*** 0.494*** 0.436*** 0.442*** 0.515*** 
 (0.069) (0.099) (0.060) (0.071) (0.076) (0.156) 
Postgraduate 0.695*** 0.713*** 0.664*** 0.597*** 0.711*** 0.933*** 
 (0.093) (0.116) (0.079) (0.124) (0.107) (0.264) 
Constant 2.461*** 1.983*** 2.224*** 2.432*** 2.645*** 2.828*** 
 (0.059) (0.086) (0.054) (0.049) (0.057) (0.122) 
 
Note: Other control variables in regressions are firm size, occupation, and dummies for sector, urban/rural residence, non-
regular working hours, and immigrant status. Standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 
10 percent level. ** denotes statistical significance at the 5 percent level. *** denotes statistical significance at the 1 percent 
level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 Labour Force Survey. 
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4.3 Counterfactual Gender Wage Gap 
 
The counterfactual gender wage gap points to a part of the gap that is due to differing 
rewards to the observed labour market characteristics. It is calculated as the difference 
between the male wage distribution and the counterfactual female wage distribution that 
would emerge if women were given men’s labour market characteristics, but remained to 
receive returns to those characteristics like women. Table 6 shows estimates at various 
points of the wage distribution that are calculated following the Machado-Mata 
decomposition approach. Figure 3 portrays the main results for 1998 and 2005. 
 
Firstly, we compare the raw gender gap (the first row for each year in Table 6) with the 
estimated counterfactual gap calculated for the three regression specifications that are 
taken to be the same as in pooled regressions. The counterfactual gap for each 
specification is sizable. It is wider than the raw gap on average and at almost all the 
observed points of the wage distribution (results at the 90th quantile are mixed). These 
findings indicate that: i) there is a rather large “unjustifiable” gender wage gap which can 
be attributed to women’s lower returns to labour market characteristics as compared to 
men’s returns and ii) labour market characteristics of employed women are much better 
than that of employed men, which explains why the raw (unadjusted) gap is lower than it 
would be the case if women and men shared the same distribution of characteristics as 
assumed when the counterfactual gap is estimated. For example, taking the broadest set 
of characteristics into consideration, women earned around 22 percent less than men at 
the median in 2005 in spite of having the same characteristics. Women’s higher-quality 
labour characteristics compensate for a part of the gap, so in the unadjusted (raw) form 
we observe a gap of around 13 percent at the median. The counterfactual gap, which is 
wider than the raw one, is not a common feature of advanced market economies, and 
this reflects the situation where women possess some advantages in productive 
characteristics, mainly education, as it is often the case in CEE economies.11 
 
At the upper parts of the distribution, the counterfactual gap is more similar to the raw 
gender gap indicating that almost the entire raw gender gap can be accounted for by 
differing rewards. Also, there is no evidence of a glass-ceiling effect due to differing 
rewards by gender, which is seemingly in contrast with the finding based on the pooled 
regressions. However, the counterfactual gap assumes that women hold men’s 
characteristics and that gender differences in characteristics cannot influence the result. 
Therefore, it appears that gender differences in education, experience, and other 
observable factors, in combination with differing rewards, account for widening the 
gender gap at the top of the distribution. 
 
Comparison of the counterfactual gaps between 1998 and 2005, as calculated using the 
broadest set of control variables (Figure 3), shows modest changes on average as well as in 
the shape of the gap across the wage distribution. In both years, the average gender wage 
                                                 
11 The counterfactual gap, which is lower than the raw gap, is found in Albrecht et al. (2003) for Sweden and de la Rica 
at al. (2005) for Spain. 
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gap is around 20 percent due to differing rewards on labour market characteristics. The 
gap is somewhat higher in the lower middle part of the distribution, and it declines as we 
approach the upper middle part of the distribution. This indicates that there is less 
“discriminatory” practice in giving different rewards for the same characteristics at 
relatively well-paid jobs. In 2005, unlike in 1998, the counterfactual gap tends to increase 
a little at the top of the distribution. The tentative explanation for this could be that an 
increasing role of the private sector in transition period in Croatia has induced the 
observed change, since the private sector usually penalises women at the upper parts of 
the distribution more than the public sector. Some more evidence for this can be found 
in the next section. 
 
Table 6  Counterfactual Gender Wage Gap 
 OLS 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
1998 
Raw Gender Gap -0.139 -0.123 -0.134 -0.116 -0.134 -0.145 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.011) (0.021) (0.010) (0.019) 
(1) Gap with education and experience as 
control variables -0.167 -0.151 -0.180 -0.183 -0.158 -0.148 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.010) 
(2) Gap with education, experience, 
employer size, sector, immigrant, 
rural, and non-regular working hours 
as control variables -0.167 -0.171 -0.182 -0.178 -0.155 -0.153 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
(3) Gap with education, experience, 
employer size, sector, and other 
control variables, including occupation -0.201 -0.221 -0.234 -0.235 -0.168 -0.109 
 (0.010) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.010) 
2005 
Raw Gender Gap -0.125 -0.105 -0.167 -0.134 -0.094 -0.182 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.025) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) 
(1) Gap with education and experience as 
control variables -0.200 -0.176 -0.209 -0.215 -0.181 -0.192 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
(2) Gap with education, experience, 
employer size, sector, immigrant, 
rural, and non-regular working hours 
as control variables -0.187 -0.178 -0.188 -0.188 -0.172 -0.196 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) 
(3) Gap with education, experience, 
employer size, sector, and other 
control variables, including occupation -0.207 -0.201 -0.227 -0.223 -0.171 -0.182 
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) 
 
Note: Reported gap is based on female counterfactuals constructed by using male characteristics and female rewards. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistics are computed using the bootstrap estimator. All the coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 Labour Force Survey. 
 
 
The counterfactual gaps calculated for the three specifications, using different sets of 
control variables, reveal the importance of occupational divisions in explaining the gap. 
There are notable differences in the estimated gap in model (2) and (3), i.e. in the 
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specifications with and without the occupation dummy variables, as shown in Table 6. 
Adding the occupation increases the gender gap in the low to middle part of the 
distribution, but decreases it a little at the top of the distribution (90th quantile) in both 
1998 and 2005. On average, the counterfactual gap increases after controlling for 
occupation. This finding is counterintuitive at first sight and might indicate that the 
gender gap between occupations is less important than the gap observed within 
occupations. The result may also reflect a level of details used in occupational 
classification. We used only 10 major occupational categories and, therefore, a within-
occupation gap could be large.  
 
Figure 3  Counterfactual Gender Wage Gap 
 
 
 
Note: The counterfactual gap is calculated using the broadest set of control variables. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 Labour Force Survey. 
 
 
5 Gender Wage Gap for Women with Children 
 
The gender wage gap could be affected by women’s responsibility for children. From 
human capital perspective, the wage effects of career interruption due to child bearing are 
connected with the loss of human capital accumulation or even a depreciation in human 
capital during the period of absence. By expecting to take child-related leaves, women 
may choose jobs which both require less continued skills upgrading and provide a more 
family-friendly environment, but at the expense of lower wages. On the other side, 
employers may suffer from a longer worker’s absence even if they do not cover 
compensations for child-related leaves, as is the case in most countries. Employers face 
costs of hiring and training additional workers and may presumably expect less career 
commitment from their female employees. Therefore, they may be less willing to hire 
women and provide them high wages or offer them promotion. This effect may be more 
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pronounced in countries with entitlements for long periods of child-related absence from 
work. 
 
Empirical studies examining the wage effects of career interruption due to child bearing 
give mixed results. Some studies have found that career interruption and loss of human 
capital accumulation due to lengthy leave have a negative impact on women’s relative 
wages (Ruhm, 1998), while others find no permanent effect on the wage gap (Albrecht et 
al. 1999; Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002). The focus of these studies was on a comparison 
of wages between mothers and non-mothers. In a similar spirit, by comparing the gender 
wage gap between mothers and childless women, we explore whether women with 
children in Croatia are in a worse-off situation supposedly because of their extended 
absence from work due to child bearing.  
 
Croatia is a country with relatively generous entitlements for child related leaves, more in 
terms of length of leave and less in terms of compensation. Most women take one year 
leave after childbirth. Mothers exclusively use the first six months of the leave (maternity 
leave), while the other six months (parental leave) can be shared between the parents.12 
Mothers use virtually all parental leave and less than 1 percent is taken up by fathers. 
Women are often absent from work for some time before childbirth, usually 45 days and 
possibly more, depending on medical considerations. In addition, mothers with young 
children can be absent from work as often as needed to take care of a sick child.13 In all 
these circumstances, wages are compensated to a certain extent by health insurance and 
by the state. However, the compensation rate is rather low, up to 100 percent of the 
average Croatian wage for maternity leave (in the first six months); and even less for 
parental leave, up to 60 percent of the average.14  
 
The wage effects of lengthy leaves have been studied for the Nordic countries where the 
overall system is generous in terms of time, the compensation rate, and availability of 
child care system. In Croatia only one part of the system is generous (length of leave), 
while other elements are not so family-friendly (compensation rate and child-care system). 
Generous maternal and parental leave schemes have been found to increase women’s 
participation in the labour market (see for instance Ruhm, 1998; Waldfogel, 1998; and 
Jaumotte, 2004). To a certain extent, the same seems to be true for Croatia (Table A4 in 
                                                 
12 For other features of the child birth related leave schemes in Croatia see Table A3 in Appendix. 
13 Lengthy absence from work in Croatia are reflected in the highest rate of health-related leave in Europe, almost 10 
days per worker per year in 2004, as documented in European Foundation for Improving of Living and Working 
Conditions (2007). Gender division is not provided in the document, but it is highly possible that a notable part of 
that figure can be attributed to maternity and parental leaves, as well as leaves due to the care of sick child. Gender 
difference in absence from work can be illustrated by figures from the LFS data base. In 2005, in our sample of 
employees, there were 2.3 percent of man and 6.2 percent of women that were absent from work for more than one 
month at the time of the survey.  
14 Underdeveloped child day care schemes make the labour market position of women with children even more 
vulnerable. Some 40 percent of children of pre-school age (0-6 years) are covered by child care (around 14 percent in 0-2 
years age group), while relatively short opening hours is another limiting factor (Matković, 2007). School in Croatia 
starts typically at the age of 6-7 years and in-school child care arrangements are poorly developed. Schools have 
relatively short hours, and they often interchange the morning and early afternoon starts, making day care of school 
age child even more complicated. 
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Appendix). In 2005, the participation rate for women in prime child bearing age (25-40 
years) was around 80 percent as compared to 90 percent for men in the same age group. 
There is only a slightly lower participation rate for mothers compared to childless 
women.15  
 
We now turn to the gender wage gap and its relation to motherhood by looking at the 
evidence regarding whether mothers face different wage treatments compared to childless 
women. A comparison of the wage gap between mothers and childless women cannot 
unambiguously confirm that the observed difference is due to child-related leave policies, 
but it can illustrate the possibly disadvantageous position of women with children.16 It is 
also possible that private and public sector responses to lengthy leaves are different. The 
private sector is under stronger market pressures to economise, and it is possible that 
employers, led by efficiency considerations, compensate “inefficient” child-related leave 
of mothers by their lower wage and segmentation into poorly-paid jobs. Therefore, we 
distinguish private sector employers from public sector employers. 
 
Table 7 presents the gender wage gap for mothers with young children (less than 12 years 
old) and the gap for other women, both calculated against the male wages. The raw 
(unadjusted) gender gap in 2005 is around 23 percent on average for mothers with 
children and about 17 percent for non-mothers, both in the private sector. The 
substantial difference in the gap between these two groups of women is observed at 
different points of the wage distribution, where the gap considerably widens at the upper 
tail (at the 90th quantile). In the public sector, the raw gender gap was substantially 
smaller and there was virtually no difference in the gap for these two groups of women.17 
At some points of the distribution an even better-off position of mothers is observed. 
These findings indicate the unequal wage treatment of mothers with young children in 
the private sector, especially at the upper part of the wage distribution.  
 
After controlling for education and experience in pooled OLS and quantile regressions 
with mother and non- mother dummies, the estimated gender wage gap for mothers 
working in the private sector increased a bit in 1998 and remained almost the same in 
2005, both compared to the raw gap in the respective years (the second panel in Table 7). 
In both years, a certain difference in the mean wage gap between mothers and other 
women is found in the private sector, but it is not statistically significant (at 5 percent 
level) either at the mean, or at the 10th, 50th and 90th quantiles. Inclusion of more control 
variables in the model resulted in a slightly lower gender wage gap for both mothers and 
                                                 
15 Some other forms of mothers’ self-selection seem weak in Croatia. In our sample of employees, only a fraction of 
women (0.5 percent) work less than 20 hours per week, and there is no significant difference between mothers and non-
mothers. There is also no strong evidence for self-selection of mothers in the public sector (Table A5 in Appendix). 
16 The leave scheme was roughly unchanged from 1998 to 2005 (the amount of allowance changed a bit, while student 
mothers and unemployed mothers are entitled for benefit only since mid-2004, too short period to be reflected in data 
for 2005), so we cannot look at differences in the wage gap which can be attached to changes in leave policy. 
17 In the public sector, especially in budgetary public sector (education, health care and public administration), a close 
parity in wages between sexes, as well as between mothers and non-mothers is due to more transparent wage setting 
rules that exclude a priori discrimination. 
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non-mothers. In the “full” model (3), the wage disadvantage of mothers against non-
mothers is mild on average, with a widening at the upper part of the distribution. 
However, the difference is statistically significant (at the 10 percent level) only at the 90th 
quantile in the private sector, in 1998 as well as in 2005, but not at the other observed 
points of the wage distribution. Results of the pooled regression give us no clear evidence 
that employers in general impose a different wage treatment for mothers with small 
children in comparison with other women. However, private sector employers provide 
lower wages to mothers at the top of the distribution compared to childless women with 
otherwise comparable labour characteristics. 
 
Decomposition analysis is a step further in exploring the effects of having children on 
women’s wages by pointing to the gap that is due to the difference in returns to labour 
market characteristics. Figure 4 presents the results (see also Table A6 in Appendix). First 
of all, the average gap for both mothers and childless women is lower in the public sector 
than in the private sector in 1998 as well as in 2005. From 1998 to 2005, the average gap 
in the private sector has increased, whereas it has substantially decreased in the public 
sector.  
 
In the private sector, the counterfactual gap for mothers is higher than that of non-
mothers all along the whole wage distribution in 1998, while in 2005 the opposite is 
found for the very low part of the distribution. On average, mothers are in a worse-off 
situation in both years compared to non-mothers. An increase in the wage gap for all 
women is found at the top of the distribution. In the public sector, the relation between 
the gap for mothers and non-mothers is less clear. On average, the wage gap for mothers 
is lower than the gap for non-mothers. However, the gap for women in general is found 
to be declining as we move up the wage distribution. A sticky floor for women in the 
public sector might be in place due to their poor returns to the labour characteristics for 
low-paid jobs. 
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Table 7  Gender Gap Based on Pooled Quantile Regressions With Mother Dummy 
 Private sector Public sector 
 OLS 10th 50th 90th OLS 10th 50th 90th 
1998 
Raw Gender Gap 
Mother -0.174 -0.087 -0.239 -0.154 -0.094 -0.105 -0.091 -0.118 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.010) (0.043) (0.015) (0.033) (0.032) (0.037) 
Non-Mother -0.152 -0.087 -0.192 -0.154 -0.108 -0.154 -0.093 -0.077 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.021) (0.027) (0.012) (0.034) (0.025) (0.025) 
(1) Gap with education and experience 
Mother -0.184 -0.123 -0.187 -0.265 -0.137 -0.110 -0.121 -0.159 
 (0.016) (0.032) (0.018) (0.030) (0.013) (0.018) (0.011) (0.018) 
Non-Mother -0.148 -0.096 -0.153 -0.214 -0.150 -0.108 -0.142 -0.181 
 (0.014) (0.028) (0.015) (0.021) (0.010) (0.017) (0.009) (0.019) 
(2) Gap with education, experience, employer size, sector, 
immigrant, rural, and non-regular working hours as controls  
Mother -0.184 -0.122 -0.191 -0.264 -0.136 -0.096 -0.110 -0.177 
 (0.016) (0.038) (0.019) (0.033) (0.013) (0.021) (0.011) (0.025) 
Non-Mother -0.148 -0.102 -0.155 -0.217 -0.151 -0.111 -0.141 -0.196 
 (0.014) (0.026) (0.013) (0.021) (0.010) (0.019) (0.010) (0.016) 
(3) Gap with education, experience, employer size, sector, and 
other control variables, including occupation 
Mother -0.181 -0.127 -0.170 -0.271 -0.131 -0.089 -0.115 -0.159 
 (0.016) (0.034) (0.017) (0.028) (0.012) (0.021) (0.016) (0.027) 
Non-Mother -0.150 -0.113 -0.154 -0.199 -0.147 -0.109 -0.143 -0.169 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.019) (0.031) (0.010) (0.017) (0.013) (0.022) 
2005 
Raw Gender Gap 
Mother -0.228 -0.174 -0.223 -0.357 -0.066 -0.088 0.000 -0.143 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.016) (0.047) (0.017) (0.039) (0.015) (0.034) 
Non-Mother -0.166 -0.138 -0.182 -0.212 -0.066 -0.129 -0.025 0.000 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.004) (0.050) (0.013) (0.034) (0.021) (0.028) 
(1) Gap with education and experience 
Mother -0.229 -0.160 -0.214 -0.294 -0.154 -0.092 -0.134 -0.182 
 (0.014) (0.026) (0.015) (0.023) (0.014) (0.028) (0.016) (0.026) 
Non-Mother -0.201 -0.127 -0.195 -0.261 -0.154 -0.107 -0.159 -0.204 
 (0.012) (0.016) (0.010) (0.028) (0.010) (0.018) (0.013) (0.020) 
(2) Gap with education, experience, employer size, sector, 
immigrant, rural, and non-regular working hours as controls 
Mother -0.219 -0.165 -0.209 -0.246 -0.136 -0.088 -0.120 -0.176 
 (0.014) (0.026) (0.018) (0.033) (0.014) (0.027) (0.014) (0.023) 
Non-Mother -0.199 -0.140 -0.199 -0.229 -0.140 -0.098 -0.138 -0.191 
 (0.012) (0.017) (0.012) (0.021) (0.010) (0.020) (0.010) (0.019) 
(3) Gap with education, experience, employer size, sector, and 
other control variables, including occupation 
Mother -0.192 -0.131 -0.183 -0.251 -0.123 -0.053 -0.104 -0.171 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.014) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) 
Non-Mother -0.174 -0.127 -0.171 -0.209 -0.125 -0.068 -0.129 -0.180 
 (0.012) (0.021) (0.015) (0.024) (0.011) (0.019) (0.012) (0.015) 
 
Note: Mother is defined by having at least one child under 12. Reported figures are the estimated coefficients for mother 
and gender dummies, followed by their standard errors in parentheses. Statistics are computed using the bootstrap 
estimator. All the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 Labour Force Survey. 
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The difference between the counterfactual gaps for mothers and non-mothers that is 
shown in Figure 5 illustrates the aforementioned findings. In 2005, mothers find 
themselves more disadvantaged than non-mothers in the private sector, especially at the 
central part of the wage distribution. They are in comparatively better position in the 
public sector, notably at the middle of the distribution. In both sectors, the differences 
are more pronounced in 2005 than in 1998. 
 
Private sector employers in Croatia are more restrained while providing wages for women 
with children. Lengthy absences from work might explain this finding. However, having 
in mind almost universal coverage of leave schemes in Croatia and the situation where 
women take up almost all of the total leave period (the share of men taking up parental 
leave is negligible), there may be negative effects of parental leave schemes on wages for 
all young women who are potential mothers, not only on mothers’ wages, as pointed out 
by Datta Gupta and Smith (2002) for the case of Denmark. In a separate set of gender 
wage gap estimates, we have compared the wage gaps calculated for young women (taken 
to be under 40 years of age) with those for older women and find the same major 
findings as in a comparison of the gap between mothers and non-mothers. Young women 
are faced with a wider gap in the private sector compared with older women, while the 
situation in the public sector is less conclusive.18 Therefore, we could speculate that it is 
not the actual absence from work due to child bearing that lowers women’s relative 
wages, but their potential absence from work which leads to the disadvantageous position 
for all young women. 
                                                 
18 The results are not presented to save space. However, the complete set of the estimates are available from the author 
upon request. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
This paper has provided a comprehensive profile of the gender wage gap in Croatia. The 
data employed in the study were taken from the Labour Force Survey for 1998 and 2005. 
Empirical evidence was based on the utilisation of the quantile regression technique and 
the Machado-Mata counterfactual decomposition method. Our main finding is that 
women in Croatia have received much lower market rewards for their human capital 
characteristics than men. In addition, employed women possess a sizable educational 
advantage over men and a relatively low and narrowing deficit in work experience. 
Therefore, the relatively small raw (unadjusted) gender wage gap of 12.5 percent in 2005 
hides much larger gender disparities. 
 
The gender wage gap of around 19 percent on average in 2005 was estimated from the 
pooled regressions, including control variables for education and experience. Adding 
more control variables reduced the gap only modestly to around 17 percent. This suggests 
that a large part of the gender wage differences remains unexplained by the observed 
individual, job, and employer characteristics. The inclusion of occupation variables in the 
set of explanatory variables decreased the gap to a certain extent, suggesting that 
occupational segregation might be important. The gender wage gap is relatively mild at 
the lower part of the wage distribution and gets larger as we move towards the top of the 
distribution. Although of limited statistical significance, this finding indicates a possible 
presence of a glass-ceiling in Croatia. It also appears that the gender wage gap adjusted 
for labour market characteristics has increased between 1998 and 2005. 
 
Regression estimates stratified by gender indicate that returns to education and 
experience are markedly different for men and women. Women face much lower returns, 
and this kind of disparity gets higher at the upper parts of the wage distribution. 
Therefore, a counterfactual decomposition analysis has been undertaken in order to 
determine the part of the gap, which results from the difference in returns to the 
observed labour characteristics. It was found that the gap is around 20 percent on average 
due to differing returns by gender. This is probably the best measure of women’s 
disadvantaged status in the wage setting in Croatia, since it is conditioned on the exactly 
same characteristics for men and women. Due to differences in returns, the gap is the 
largest at the middle of the distribution, tempering therefore our previous finding on the 
presence of a glass ceiling. However, it seems that the interplay between differing returns 
and women’s educational advantage at high-paid jobs produces a kind of a glass ceiling.  
 
This paper has also explored the potential impact of motherhood on women’s relative 
wages in Croatia. It was found that private sector employers provide lower wages to 
mothers with young children than to other women with the same observed labour 
characteristics. The difference was significant at the top of the wage distribution, but not 
elsewhere. In the public sector, there was no clear evidence of a different wage treatment 
between mothers and non-mothers.  
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The estimated gender wage gap for Croatia could be illustrative for many other countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Relatively low raw gender wage gap widens after 
accounting for education, as women in many of these countries possess a relative 
education advantage over men. A relatively generous parental leave policy gives women a 
strong incentive to participate in the labour market in their prime child bearing age. At 
the same time, a strong career commitment is not easy to follow when the family policy 
is restricted to allow only for lengthy leaves, without other family-friendly measures for 
women’s inclusion in the labour market (for instance, an affordable and flexible child 
day-care system). In situations where women take up almost the whole leave period and 
take the major responsibility for child rearing, the door is open for wages for all young 
women to fall behind their male counterparts. Only a more equitable sharing of family 
responsibilities between parents, including a take up of parental leave, could significantly 
reduce the part of the gap that is due to child-related absence from work.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A1  OLS and Quantile Regressions, 1998 
 OLS 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Female -0.160 -0.116 -0.130 -0.157 -0.177 -0.204 
 (0.008) (0.016) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) 
Experience 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.009 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Experience Squared (/100) -0.008 -0.010 -0.006 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Education (vs. Unfinished Primary) 
Primary 0.056 0.036 0.074 0.082 0.090 0.041 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.061) 
Vocational Secondary 0.134 0.106 0.144 0.152 0.174 0.128 
 (0.025) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027) (0.060) 
General Secondary 0.212 0.181 0.224 0.246 0.262 0.227 
 (0.025) (0.033) (0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.060) 
2-year College 0.333 0.392 0.370 0.330 0.327 0.313 
 (0.028) (0.044) (0.030) (0.033) (0.032) (0.068) 
University Graduate 0.429 0.402 0.431 0.460 0.439 0.451 
 (0.032) (0.053) (0.035) (0.040) (0.044) (0.076) 
Postgraduate 0.568 0.555 0.545 0.528 0.533 0.665 
 (0.051) (0.054) (0.043) (0.048) (0.060) (0.141) 
Occupation (vs. Elementary) 
Plant/Machine Operator 0.044 -0.018 0.034 0.072 0.084 0.039 
 (0.015) (0.032) (0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.029) 
Craftsman 0.067 0.028 0.056 0.071 0.092 0.047 
 (0.015) (0.034) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.030) 
Farming -0.042 -0.077 -0.022 0.018 0.041 0.036 
 (0.051) (0.158) (0.069) (0.073) (0.044) (0.059) 
Service and Sales 0.036 0.011 0.045 0.050 0.072 0.013 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.015) (0.014) (0.019) (0.031) 
Clerk 0.204 0.203 0.209 0.212 0.226 0.178 
 (0.015) (0.027) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.029) 
Technician 0.276 0.262 0.279 0.291 0.299 0.240 
 (0.016) (0.031) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.032) 
Professional 0.381 0.374 0.385 0.371 0.438 0.353 
 (0.026) (0.044) (0.026) (0.027) (0.035) (0.056) 
Management and Administration 0.566 0.519 0.506 0.514 0.659 0.756 
 (0.041) (0.062) (0.035) (0.041) (0.069) (0.111) 
Military 0.593 0.521 0.627 0.639 0.623 0.542 
 (0.025) (0.075) (0.050) (0.042) (0.022) (0.052) 
Firm Size (vs. <10 Employees) 
10-50 Employees 0.017 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.006 
 (0.011) (0.021) (0.011) (0.009) (0.014) (0.017) 
50-200 Employees 0.005 -0.002 0.010 -0.008 -0.005 -0.003 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.017) 
Over 200 Employees 0.052 0.051 0.044 0.037 0.029 0.026 
 (0.011) (0.019) (0.015) (0.011) (0.013) (0.019) 
Public 0.045 0.104 0.098 0.068 0.032 -0.025 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) 
Rural -0.058 -0.065 -0.062 -0.059 -0.061 -0.058 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) 
Non-regular Hours 0.059 0.058 0.049 0.046 0.084 0.085 
 (0.012) (0.020) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.020) 
Immigrant -0.041 -0.074 -0.039 -0.011 -0.049 0.006 
 (0.025) (0.045) (0.036) (0.026) (0.028) (0.061) 
Constant 2.125 1.745 1.876 2.072 2.269 2.584 
 (0.026) (0.041) (0.030) (0.028) (0.031) (0.069) 
(Adjusted R2) Pseudo R2  (0.3866) 0.1914 0.2379 0.2529 0.245 0.2316 
 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Bold letters indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 
whereas italics indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 LFS.  
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Table A2  OLS and Quantile Regressions, 2005 
 OLS 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
Female -0.169 -0.104 -0.140 -0.168 -0.191 -0.217 
 (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.016) 
Experience 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.015 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Experience Squared (/100) -0.020 -0.015 -0.018 -0.022 -0.024 -0.023 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) 
Education (vs. Unfinished Primary) 
Primary 0.028 0.127 0.090 0.035 0.030 0.068 
 (0.044) (0.068) (0.046) (0.031) (0.042) (0.077) 
Vocational Secondary 0.128 0.240 0.204 0.138 0.113 0.131 
 (0.044) (0.070) (0.047) (0.032) (0.046) (0.079) 
General Secondary 0.201 0.303 0.244 0.219 0.196 0.211 
 (0.045) (0.070) (0.049) (0.031) (0.046) (0.077) 
2-year College 0.320 0.442 0.378 0.330 0.292 0.331 
 (0.046) (0.077) (0.049) (0.036) (0.053) (0.084) 
University Graduate 0.405 0.509 0.457 0.410 0.396 0.462 
 (0.050) (0.079) (0.059) (0.042) (0.060) (0.093) 
Postgraduate 0.667 0.741 0.647 0.637 0.692 0.748 
 (0.066) (0.080) (0.066) (0.060) (0.082) (0.116) 
Occupation (vs. Elementary) 
Plant/Machine Operator 0.042 0.016 0.027 0.046 0.072 0.077 
 (0.015) (0.024) (0.018) (0.019) (0.021) (0.029) 
Craftsman 0.143 0.123 0.127 0.128 0.169 0.177 
 (0.016) (0.027) (0.021) (0.018) (0.023) (0.040) 
Farming -0.001 -0.136 0.013 0.105 0.137 0.203 
 (0.059) (0.141) (0.066) (0.060) (0.028) (0.062) 
Service and Sales 0.063 0.073 0.057 0.071 0.093 0.086 
 (0.015) (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.020) (0.034) 
Clerk 0.221 0.220 0.231 0.217 0.246 0.276 
 (0.015) (0.029) (0.022) (0.017) (0.024) (0.034) 
Technician 0.322 0.329 0.330 0.315 0.342 0.337 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.020) (0.016) (0.023) (0.038) 
Professional 0.464 0.427 0.402 0.413 0.512 0.544 
 (0.027) (0.043) (0.039) (0.032) (0.042) (0.046) 
Management and Administration 0.676 0.522 0.576 0.662 0.857 0.864 
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.053) (0.031) (0.066) (0.057) 
Military 0.344 0.454 0.344 0.321 0.285 0.336 
 (0.025) (0.042) (0.037) (0.029) (0.037) (0.077) 
Firm size (vs. <10 Employees) 
10-50 Employees 0.062 0.096 0.061 0.050 0.028 0.039 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.017) 
50-200 Employees 0.046 0.083 0.038 0.038 0.023 0.035 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.019) 
Over 200 Employees 0.085 0.095 0.072 0.074 0.068 0.076 
 (0.011) (0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.019) 
Public 0.087 0.203 0.177 0.110 0.055 -0.020 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) 
Rural -0.056 -0.047 -0.056 -0.055 -0.054 -0.049 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.012) 
Non-regular Hours 0.087 0.025 0.066 0.084 0.100 0.154 
 (0.011) (0.020) (0.015) (0.010) (0.015) (0.023) 
Immigrant -0.050 -0.055 -0.064 -0.042 -0.040 0.000 
 (0.020) (0.031) (0.024) (0.020) (0.023) (0.039) 
Constant 2.511 1.983 2.244 2.494 2.703 2.859 
 (0.044) (0.071) (0.047) (0.033) (0.048) (0.083) 
(Adjusted R2) Pseudo R2  (0.4773) 0.2719 0.3096 0.3175 0.3053 0.3028 
 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parentheses. Bold letters indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent level, 
whereas italics indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 LFS.  
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Table A3  Maternity Leave, Paternity Leave, and Parental Leave in Croatia, 2005 
 Length of Child Birth Related Leave Benefits 
Maternity 45 days before the expected birth date (28 days 
mandated); 6 months after the birth (42 days 
mandated) 
100%  
(min. HRK 1,663 per month, cca 40% of 
average wage; max. HRK 4,257 cca 100% of 
average wage)  
Paternity Up to 7 days 100% 
Parental 6 months (with 2 additional months if the father 
takes at least 3 months leave)  
 
Until 3 years of the child for twins, the third and 
any subsequent child  
 
Until 3 years of the child 
Full-time fixed allowance of HRK 1,663-2,500 
per month (cca. 40%-60% of average wage) 
 
Full-time fixed allowance of HRK 1,663 after the 
first year (cca. 40%of average wage) 
 
Unpaid (after the first year) 
 
Note: Student mothers and unemployed mothers are entitled for 1 year maternity leave (or until 3 years of the child for 
twins, the third and any subsequent child) with a fixed allowance of HRK 1,663 (cca. 40 percent of the average monthly 
wage) 
Source: Author’s classification based on Croatian Institute for Health Insurance (2007). 
 
 
Table A4  Labour Force Participation (15-64 Years) 
 
Men 
(25-40 years) 
Other 
Men 
Mothers* 
(25-40 years) 
Non-Mothers 
(25-40 years) 
Other 
Women 
1998 
Participation Rate  89.9% 60.7% 75.1% 83.4% 46.1% 
Employment Rate  80.8% 53.3% 66.7% 73.7% 40.0% 
Unemployment Rate  10.2% 12.2% 11.2% 11.7% 13.2% 
2005 
Participation Rate  89.3% 62.2% 78.5% 83.7% 47.7% 
Employment Rate  80.0% 54.3% 67.1% 70.5% 40.8% 
Unemployment Rate 10.4% 12.7% 14.5% 15.7% 14.4% 
 
Note: *Refers to mothers with children of less than 12 years of age. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 LFS.  
 
 
Table A5  Sector Composition of Employment 
 
Men 
(25-40 years) 
Other 
Men 
Mothers* 
(25-40 years) 
Non-Mothers 
(25-40 years) 
Other 
Women 
1998 
Private Sector (% of total) 39.0% 36.2% 40.4% 41.4% 38.6% 
Public Sector (% of total) 61.0% 63.8% 59.6% 58.6% 61.4% 
Number of Observations 2,395 2,959 1,355 896 2,408 
2005 
Private Sector (% of total) 62.4% 57.3% 62.4% 62.1% 51.0% 
Public Sector (% of total) 37.6% 42.7% 37.6% 37.9% 49.0% 
Number of Observations 1,978 3,084 977 760 2,403 
 
Note: *Refers to mothers with children of less than 12 years of age. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 LFS.  
 
 
 
 40 
Table A6  Counterfactual Gender Wage Gap for Mothers/Non-Mothers 
 Private Sector Public Sector 
 OLS 10th 50th 90th OLS 10th 50th 90th 
1998 
Raw Gender Gap 
Mother -0.174 -0.087 -0.239 -0.154 -0.094 -0.105 -0.091 -0.118 
 (0.018) (0.029) (0.010) (0.043) (0.015) (0.033) (0.032) (0.037) 
Non-Mother -0.152 -0.087 -0.192 -0.154 -0.108 -0.154 -0.093 -0.077 
 (0.016) (0.029) (0.021) (0.027) (0.012) (0.034) (0.025) (0.025) 
Gap with education, experience, employer size, sector, and other 
control variables, including occupation 
Mother -0.233 -0.199 -0.242 -0.212 -0.173 -0.260 -0.220 -0.071 
 (0.025) (0.015) (0.010) (0.019) (0.028) (0.017) (0.012) (0.013) 
Non-Mother -0.199 -0.183 -0.220 -0.194 -0.196 -0.275 -0.214 -0.066 
 (0.025) (0.013) (0.010) (0.020) (0.028) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) 
2005 
Raw Gender Gap 
Mother -0.228 -0.174 -0.223 -0.357 -0.066 -0.088 0.000 -0.143 
 (0.016) (0.023) (0.016) (0.047) (0.017) (0.039) (0.015) (0.034) 
Non-Mother -0.166 -0.138 -0.182 -0.212 -0.066 -0.129 -0.025 0.000 
 (0.014) (0.023) (0.004) (0.050) (0.013) (0.034) (0.021) (0.028) 
Gap with education, experience, employer size, sector, and other 
control variables, including occupation 
Mother -0.253 -0.190 -0.285 -0.264 -0.138 -0.298 -0.079 -0.083 
 (0.027) (0.013) (0.010) (0.025) (0.042) (0.020) (0.010) (0.013) 
Non-Mother -0.220 -0.207 -0.222 -0.224 -0.160 -0.255 -0.152 -0.088 
 (0.027) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018) (0.042) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) 
 
Note: Mother is defined by having at least one child under 12. Reported gap is based on counterfactuals constructed using 
male characteristics and female rewards. Standard errors are in parentheses. Statistics are computed using the bootstrap 
estimator. All the coefficients are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 and 2005 LFS.  
 
 41 
References  
 
Albrecht, J., A. Björklund and S. Vroman, 2003, “Is There a Glass Ceiling in Sweden?”, 
Journal of Labor Economics, 21(1), pp. 145-177. 
 
Albrecht, J.W., P.-A. Edin, M. Sundstrøm and S.B. Wroman, 1999, “Career Interruptions 
and Subsequent Earnings: A Reexamination using Swedish Data”, Journal of Human 
Resources, 34(2), pp. 294-311. 
 
Arulampalam, W., A. Booth and M. Bryan, 2004, “Is There a Glass Ceiling over Europe? 
Exploring the Gender Pay Gap across the Wages Distribution”, IZA Discussion Paper no. 
1373, The Institute for the Study of Labor, Bonn. 
 
Bisogno, M., 2000, “Croatian Labor Market in Transition” in World Bank, 2000, 
“Croatia: Economic Vulnerability and Welfare Study”, Volume II: Technical Papers, 
Document of the World Bank, Washington, D. C.: The World Bank. 
 
Blinder, A., 1973, “Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates”, 
Journal of Human Resources, 8, pp. 436-455. 
 
Brainerd, E., 2000, “Women in Transition: Changes in Gender Wage Differentials in 
Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union”, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 
54(1), pp. 138-162. 
 
Buchinsky, M., 1994, “Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure 1963-1987: Application of 
Quantile Regression”, Econometrica, 62(2), pp. 405-458. 
 
Buchinsky, M., 1998, “The Dynamics of Changes in the Female Wage Distribution in the 
USA: A Quantile Regression Approach”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 13, pp. 1-30. 
 
Croatian Institute for Health Insurance, 2007, “Rodiljne naknade” (“Compensations for 
Maternity Leave and Parental Leave”), available from the official web page of the 
Croatian Institute for Health Insurance  
(http://www.hzzo-net.hr/obvezno/rodiljne_naknade.htm).  
 
Datta Gupta, N. and N. Smith, 2002, “Children and Career Interruptions: The Family 
Gap in Denmark”, Economica, 69, pp. 609-29. 
 
Datta Gupta, N., N. Smith and M. Verner, 2006, “Child Care and Parental Leave in the 
Nordic Countries: A Model to Aspire to?”, IZA Discussion Paper no. 2014, The Institute 
for the Study of Labor, Bonn. 
 
De la Rica, S., J. Dolado and V. Llorens, 2005, “Ceiling and Floors: Gender Wage Gaps 
by Education in Spain”, IZA Discussion Paper no.1483, The Institute for the Study of 
Labor, Bonn. 
 
European Foundation for Improving of Living and Working Conditions, 2007, Fourth 
European Working Conditions Survey, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the 
European Unions. 
 
Garcia, J., P. Hernandez and A. Lopez-Nicolas, 2001, “How wide is the gap? An 
investigation of gender wage differences using quantile regression”, Empirical Economics, 
26, pp. 149-167. 
 42 
Jaumotte, F., 2004, “Labour Force Participation of Women: Empirical Evidence on the 
Role of Policy and Others Determinants in OECD Countries”, OECD Economic Studies, 
37 (2003/2), Paris. 
 
Kee, H. J., 2006, “Glass Ceiling or Sticky Floor? Exploring the Australian Gender Pay 
Gap”, Economic Record, 82, pp. 408-427. 
 
Machado, J. and J. Mata, 2001, “Earnings Functions in Portugal 1982-1994: Evidence 
from Quantile Regressions”, Empirical Economics, 26, pp. 115-134. 
 
Machado, J. and J. Mata, 2005, “Counterfactual Decomposition of Changes in Wage 
Distributions using Quantile Regression”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20, pp. 445-465. 
 
Matković, T., 2007, “Obuhvat sustavom predskolske skrbi u Hrvatskoj, 1998-2005.” 
(“Coverage of the Pre-School Child Care in Croatia, 1998-2005”), Revija za socijalnu 
politiku, 14(1), pp. 113-135. 
 
Mincer, J., 1974, Schooling, Experience and Earnings, New York: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
 
Nestić, D., 2005, “The Determinants of Wages in Croatia: Evidence from Earnings 
Regressions”, in 65th Anniversary Conference of the Institute of Economics, Zagreb, Proceedings, 
ed. Lovrinčević et al., pp. 131-162, Zagreb: The Institute of Economics. 
 
Newell, A. and B. Reilly, 2001, “The Gender Pay Gap in the Transition from 
Communism: Some Empirical Evidence”, Economic Systems, 25, pp. 287-304. 
 
Oaxaca, R., 1973, “Male-Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets” International 
Economic Review, 14, pp. 693-709. 
 
Orazem, P. and M. Vodopivec, 1995, “Winners and Losers in Transition: Returns to 
Education, Experience, and Gender in Slovenia”, The World Bank Economic Review, 9(2), 
pp. 201-230. 
 
Rogers, W. H., 1992, “Quantile Regression Standard Errors”, Stata Technical Bulletin, 9, 
pp. 16-19. Reprinted in Stata Technical Bulletin Reprints, 2, pp. 133-137. 
 
Rosholm M. and N. Smith, 1996, “The Danish Gender Wage Gap in the 1980s: A Panel 
Data Study”, Oxford Economic Papers, 48, pp. 254-79. 
 
Ruhm, C. 1998. “The Economic Consequences of Parental Leave Mandates: Lessons from 
Europe” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, pp. 285-317. 
 
Rutkowski, J., 2001, “Earnings Inequality in Transition Economies of Central Europe 
Trends and Patterns During the 1990s”, Social Protection Discussion Paper Series no. 
117, The World Bank, Washington D.C. 
 
Waldfogel, J., 1998, “Understanding the ‘Family Gap’ in Pay for Women with Children”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 12(1), pp. 137-156. 
 43 
Popis objavljenih Radnih materijala EIZ-a / Previous issues in this series 
 
 
2007 
 
EIZ-WP-0701 Andrea Mervar and James E. Payne: An Analysis of Foreign Tourism Demand for 
Croatian Destinations: Long-Run Elasticity Estimates 
EIZ-WP-0702 Sonja Radas and Mario Teisl: An Open Mind Wants More: Opinion Strength and 
the Desire for Genetically Modified Food Labeling Policy 
EIZ-WP-0703 Maruška Vizek and Tanja Broz: Modelling Inflation in Croatia 
 
 
 
 
 
ISSN 1846-4238
